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INTRODUCTION 
When Stockton, California, a city of just under 300,000 people, 
filed for Chapter 9 protection on June 28, 2012,1 it became the largest 
U.S. city by population to do so.2  Like other municipalities, Stockton 
has been greatly affected by the collapse of the sub-prime lending 
market from 2007 to 2008.3  Stockton, however, was 
disproportionately affected because of its location in the Central 
Valley region of California, an attractive location for those who want 
to live near the Bay area, with one out of every thirty homes in 
foreclosure.4  The high foreclosure rate, coupled with declining home 
values, has decreased Stockton’s tax revenue from property taxes.5  
Because of this decrease in tax revenue, the city has had difficulties 
repaying obligations to creditors as they become due.6  In order to 
meet its obligations, Stockton has been forced to cut the services it 
provides to citizens to the bare minimum required to maintain the 
city.7  Although Stockton has been ranked as the second most 
dangerous city in California, second only to Oakland, and one of the 
ten most dangerous cities in America, it has had to slash its police 
force by twenty-five percent to cut costs.8  Stockton was also named 
 
 1. Chapter 9 Voluntary Petition at 1, In re City of Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 1. 
 2. See Nate Berg, The 7 Biggest Cities Ever to File for Bankruptcy, ATLANTIC 
CITIES (June 27, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2012/06/7-
biggest-cities-file-bankruptcy/2397/; Stockton (City), California, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/0675000.html (last updated June 
27, 2013).  Detroit, Michigan filed for Chapter 9 protection on July 18, 2013, 
supplanting Stockton as the largest city by population to file for bankruptcy. Monica 
Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles Into Insolvency, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-
bankruptcy.html?hp&_r=0. 
 3. See generally FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
MARKET: NATIONAL AND TWELFTH DISTRICT DEVELOPMENTS (2007), available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/files/2007annualreport.pdf. 
 4. Les Christie, California Cities Fill Top 10 Foreclosure List, CNN MONEY 
(Aug. 14, 2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/14/real_estate/California_cities_lead_ 
foreclosure/index.htm. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Malia Wollan, Years of Unraveling, Then Bankruptcy for a City, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/us/years-of-unraveling-then-
bankruptcy-for-a-city.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 8. Id.; America’s 10 Most Dangerous Cities, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews. 
com/2300-504083_162-10007941.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
LAU_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:17 PM 
2013] MODIFYING PENSION PLANS 1977 
America’s most miserable city by Forbes in 2011.9  Citizens who are 
able to leave the city are doing so as a result, sending Stockton into a 
downward spiral with even more decreases in revenue from property 
taxes.10  After rounds of failed negotiations with creditors, required by 
Section 53760 of the California Government Code, Stockton filed for 
Chapter 9 protection to solve its fiscal crisis.11  The California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), a state executive agency 
that manages pension and health benefits for California’s public 
employees, retirees, and their families,12 is Stockton’s largest creditor, 
with a contingent, unliquidated claim of over $147 million.13  This 
obligation is an obstacle to a city that is trying to provide for its 
citizens, meet other debt obligations, and maintain some form of 
credit in order to borrow in the future. 
The story of Stockton is not unlike that of many other U.S. cities.  
Municipalities have mounting obligations as a result of providing 
services, building infrastructure, paying payroll, and contributing to 
benefits for city employees.14  The economic recession and collapse of 
real estate values reduced the tax base and tax revenues generated at 
the local level with lower property values translating to decreased 
property taxes.15  The result is a lower municipal income and tighter 
budget constraints.16  The high foreclosure rate reduces the value of 
the property foreclosed upon and that of surrounding properties.  
There is also less federal funding to states, which means less state 
funding for municipalities.  Some municipalities operate on short-
term financing, borrowing money in the form of bonds in order to pay 
for current obligations.17  These municipalities need to continuously 
 
 9. Kurt Badenhausen, America’s Most Miserable Cities, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/2011/02/02/stockton-miami-cleveland-business-washington-
miserable-cities.html. 
 10. Wollan, supra note 7. 
 11. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53760, 53760.3 (West 2012). 
 12. CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYS., FACTS AT A GLANCE (2012), 
available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/general.pdf. 
 13. List of Creditors Holding 20 Largest Unsecured Claims at 1, In re City of 
Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 4. 
 14. See generally Will Hueske, Chapter 9 Update: Alabama Municipalities 
Eligible as “Debtors” Under 109(c), WEIL BANKR. BLOG (May 22, 2012), 
http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/chapter-9/chapter-9-update-alabama-
municipalities-eligible-as-debtors-under-section-109c. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See Michael Corkery & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, New Hit to Strapped States—
Borrowing Costs Up as Bond Flops; Refinancing Crunch Nears, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 
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borrow money in order to meet those obligations.18  When credit 
froze, these municipalities defaulted on their obligations, which in 
turn caused additional cross-defaults on other credit obligations.19 
Public pension plan obligations are an increasing problem for 
municipalities with large deficits.20  Public employees are promised 
more in their retirement plans than the municipalities can afford to 
pay.21  Pension plans have been underfunded in the last couple of 
years because estimated rates of return on pension plan investments 
have been significantly higher than actual returns.22  Municipalities 
typically promise public employees defined-benefit plans, where 
employees are promised certain specific benefits upon retirement.23  
The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) has provided 
general standards for accounting and financial reporting that most 
state and local government plans follow.24  However, median 
investment return for public pension funds was negative 24.91% in 
2008.25  The aggregate market value of state and local government 
pension funds dropped from $3.2 trillion in 2006 to just $2.3 trillion as 
of October 31, 2008.26  This chronic underfunding, coupled with 
demographic pressures like increased life expectancies and pension 
envy, where public sector employees generally expect larger pensions 
than their private sector counterparts, has contributed to the 
mounting pension obligations of many municipalities. 
 
2011, at A1 (reporting on the elevated rates municipalities are being forced to pay to 
issue debt). 
 18. See generally id. 
 19. Hueske, supra note 14. 
 20. See Jeffrey Ellman & Daniel Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can 
Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 365, 368–69 (2011). 
 21. See id. at 368. 
 22. Id. at 369. 
 23. See id. at 374. 
 24. See generally GOV’T ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SUMMARY OF STATEMENT NO. 
25: FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS AND NOTE 
DISCLOSURES FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS (1994), available at http:// 
www.gasb.org/st/summary/gstsm25.html; GOV’T ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SUMMARY 
OF STATEMENT NO. 27: ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS BY STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (1994), available at http://www.gasb.org/st/summary/ 
gstsm27.html. 
 25. STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS DIRECT, STANDARD & POOR’S, MARKET 
DECLINES WILL SHAKE UP U.S. STATE PENSION FUND STABILITY 2 (2009). 
 26. Jonathan Barry Forman, Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 837, 850–51 (2009). 
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Part I of this Note provides background information on Chapter 927 
of the Bankruptcy Code, treatment of private sector pension plans 
under Chapter 11, and the differences between Chapter 9 and 
Chapter 11 as they relate to pension obligations.  This Note then 
examines the conflicts presented by various state law perspectives on 
the nature of pension plans and their ability to be modified, whether a 
pension plan is an executory contract, and federalism issues regarding 
treatment of prepetition breach of contract claims.  This Note then 
argues that in jurisdictions such as California, where public 
employees’ rights under pension plans are viewed as contractual 
rights, pension plans may be rejected as executory contracts, pursuant 
to § 365,28 as applied at a Chapter 9 municipal reorganization 
proceeding.  The extent to which rejection amounts to a modification 
of pension plan obligations will depend upon the extent to which 
these obligations have “vested” under federal law.  Thus, 
municipalities may use the tools available in bankruptcy to reorganize 
debt and better provide for their constituencies going forward. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 9 AND PENSIONS IN CHAPTER 11 
GENERALLY 
Since Chapter 9 bankruptcies are so rare, there is little case law on 
treatment of pensions in Chapter 9.  Chapter 9, a reorganization 
chapter, adopts many of the provisions available in a chapter 11 
bankruptcy, also a reorganization chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.29  
As such, an analysis of treatment of pensions in chapter 11 is 
necessary to analogize what may happen in chapter 9 bankruptcies, 
taking into account the differences between the two chapters.  Here, 
this Note discusses Chapter 9 bankruptcies generally, how pensions 
are treated in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, what makes treatment of 
pensions in Chapter 9 more complicated than treatment of pensions 
in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, and why California is the focus of this 
Note. 
 
 27. In this Note, whenever a chapter is listed, it refers to a chapter in the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
 28. In this Note, whenever a section is listed, it refers to 11 U.S.C., the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
 29. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (listing sections of the Bankruptcy Code that apply 
to Chapter 9 bankruptcies and including provisions of Chapter 11). 
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A. Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Generally 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code allows municipalities to 
reorganize their debts.30  It provides municipalities in financial-
distress protection from creditors while it develops and negotiates a 
plan for readjusting its debts.  This reorganization typically involves 
extending debt maturities, reducing the principal or interest rates of 
loans, and refinancing existing debt.31 
Chapter 9 is different from other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, 
in that some provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not apply.32  Only 
those sections listed in § 901 apply to Chapter 9 bankruptcies, while 
all provisions of Chapters 1, 3, and 5 apply to bankruptcies under 
Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.33  In the context of 
pension modification, Chapter 11 reorganizations have specific 
provisions that govern rejection of collective bargaining agreements 
and treatment of retiree health benefits.34  Sections 1113 and 1114, 
which discuss collective bargaining agreements and retiree health 
benefits, respectively, might otherwise govern in a Chapter 9 
reorganization, but neither is listed as an applicable provision under § 
901.35  Section 362, however, does apply to Chapter 9 bankruptcies, 
giving municipalities the benefit of the automatic stay while it 
 
 30. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–46 (2012). 
 31. See, e.g., Chapter 9 Plan Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts 
Filed by Debtor The City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, In re City of Central Falls, 
R.I., No. 11-13105 (Bankr. D.R.I. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 479. 
 32. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (specifically listing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
that apply and omitting those that do not). 
 33. 11 U.S.C. § 901 provides, in relevant part: 
(a) Sections 301, 333, 344, 347(b), 349, 350(b)[,] 351[,] 361, 362, 364(c), 
364(d), 364(e), 364(f), 365, 366, 501, 502, 503, 504, 506, 507(a)(2), 509, 510, 
524(a)(1), 524(a)(2), 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549(a), 549(c), 549(d), 550, 551, 
552, 553, 555, 556, 557, 559, 560, 561, 562, 1102, 1103, 1109, 1111(b), 1122, 
1123(a)(1), 1123(a)(2), 1123(a)(3), 1123(a)(4), 1123(a)(5), 1123(b), 1123(d), 
1124, 1125, 1126(a), 1126(b), 1126(c), 1126(e), 1126(f), 1126(g), 1127(d), 
1128, 1129(a)(2), 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(6), 1129(a)(8), 1129(a)(10), 
1129(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(A), 1129(b)(2)(B), 1142(b), 1143, 1144, and 1145 of 
this title apply in a case under this chapter. 
Id. 
 34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113, 1114 (2012). 
 35. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (not listing §§ 1113 and 1114 as applicable sections 
under Chapter 9). 
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attempts to negotiate with creditors.36  Section 365 also applies, which 
allows the debtor to assume or reject executory contracts.37 
There are two significant sources of limitations in Chapter 9 that 
differentiate Chapter 9 from other sections of the Bankruptcy Code: a 
municipality cannot liquidate and dissolve in bankruptcy, and there 
are constitutional limits of the bankruptcy court’s power.38  Giving the 
Bankruptcy Court the power to approve and manage a liquidation 
and dissolution would be a violation of the Tenth Amendment’s 
protection to states of sovereignty over their internal affairs.39  States 
can dictate whether their municipalities seek Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
protection.40  An unauthorized municipality is ineligible for relief.41  It 
is through the requirement of state authorization that Chapter 9 
satisfies the requirements of federalism.  Through these means, the 
federal government’s interests in financially sound municipalities are 
balanced against states’ sovereign authority over its municipalities. 
Section 109 governs eligibility for Chapter 9.42  Under § 109, an 
entity must be (1) a municipality, (2) authorized by statute by the 
state where the municipality is located, (3) that is insolvent and (4) 
desires to affect a plan to adjust such debts, and (5) (A) has obtained 
the agreement of impaired classes of creditors; (B) has failed to 
obtain the agreement of impaired classes of creditors after good faith 
negotiations; (C) cannot negotiate with creditors because such 
negotiation is impracticable; or (D) believes that a creditor may 
attempt to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under § 547.43  The 
second requirement under § 109, that a state statute specifically 
authorizes the municipality to enter Chapter 9, allows states to act as 
gatekeepers as to whether and which municipalities can file for 
Chapter 9 protection.44  States vary in their approach to this 
 
 36. Id.  Section 362 is listed under § 901 as a provision that applies in Chapter 9.  
Section 362 governs the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012).  Section 365 is listed under § 901 as a provision that 
applies in chapter 9.  Section 365 governs the executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. § 365 
(2012). 
 38. See Lee Bogdanoff, Understanding Chapter 9 in Today’s Economic 
Environment, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 49 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 
2011) (noting that the bankruptcy court cannot convert a Chapter 9 case into a 
Chapter 7 liquidation case). 
 39. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 40. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. In re City of Vallejo, Cal. 403 B.R. 72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009). 
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provision.45  Some states preclude access to Chapter 9 for all 
municipalities within their jurisdiction; others broadly permit access 
to Chapter 9.46  Twenty-three states do not provide access to Chapter 
9.47  Of these twenty-three states, twenty-one do not have statutes 
allowing municipalities in the state to file for Chapter 9 protection, 
while Georgia and Iowa explicitly deny access to Chapter 9 by 
statute.48  Some states condition eligibility, providing that only those 
municipalities meeting specified requirements can file for bankruptcy 
 
 45. Transcript of Proceedings (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) (Trial 
Volume IV) at 575, In re City of Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 
28, 2012), ECF No. 898. 
 46. Id. (“Now, that raises a number of possibilities in various states around the 
country in their gatekeeping function, and this is what gives the states the power to 
control whether Chapter 9 cases are filed, have a number of alternatives.  For 
example, in the State of Rhode Island, which recently went through the case of 
Central Falls, Rhode Island, the state-mandated procedure was that there was a 
receiver in charge of the city that came in, had the authority to throw out the city 
council, the mayor, run the city, and have all the deals that could be made.  And that 
receiver had authority to file a Chapter 9 case if the receiver concluded that Chapter 
9 was necessary for him to accomplish his mission, and that’s what happened.  So 
that’s an example of somebody empowered by state law to authorize an entity to 
file.”). 
 47. CORY EUCALITTO ET AL., STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS, MUNICIPAL 
BANKRUPTCY: AN OVERVIEW FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/doclib/20130301_SBSBankrupcyReport.pdf 
(showing Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming as the twenty-one states without such statutes). 
 48. Id.  Georgia law provides: 
(a) No county, municipality, school district, authority, division, 
instrumentality, political subdivision, or public body corporate created 
under the Constitution or laws of this state shall be authorized to file a 
petition for relief from payment of its debts as they mature or a petition for 
composition of its debts under any federal statute providing for such relief 
or composition or otherwise to take advantage of any federal statute 
providing for the adjustment of debts of political subdivisions and public 
agencies and instrumentalities. 
(b) No chief executive, mayor, board of commissioners, city council, board 
of trustees, or other governmental officer, governing body, or organization 
shall be empowered to cause or authorize the filing by or on behalf of any 
county, municipality, school district, authority, division, instrumentality, 
political subdivision, or public body corporate created under the 
Constitution or laws of this state of any petition for relief from payment of 
its debts as they mature or a petition for composition of its debts under any 
federal statute providing for such relief or composition or otherwise to take 
advantage of any federal statute providing for the adjustment of debts of 
political subdivisions and public agencies and instrumentalities. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (2012). 
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protection.49  Some states specifically authorize municipalities to file 
for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection with no condition, but California 
allows for broad, blanket authorization as long as one listed condition 
applies.50  California is one of these states providing broad municipal 
access to Chapter 9.51 
The bankruptcy court’s power under Chapter 9 is more limited 
than in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.52  The bankruptcy court is less 
involved in the conduct and operation of the municipality in 
bankruptcy, while a debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 
reorganization fully submits itself to bankruptcy court jurisdiction.53  
Section 904 explicitly provides that a bankruptcy court may not 
interfere with a municipality’s governmental powers, the property or 
revenue of the debtor, or the debtor’s use of income-producing 
property.54  A court also may not appoint a trustee or receiver to 
oversee the affairs of the debtor in bankruptcy.55  In a Chapter 9 case, 
 
 49. For example, Pennsylvania prohibits Third-Class cities (population under 
250,000 and not classified as Second Class A) from filing. In re City of Harrisburg, 
Pa., 465 B.R. 744, 752–53 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011) (applying 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
1601-D.1 (2013)); see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101 (outlining requirements for 
classification as Second Class A).  First-Class cities may file with the Governor’s 
approval. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 12720.211.  Second-Class cities may file with 
Governor’s approval. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 28211.  In Alabama, a municipality must 
have bond debt in order to be eligible for Chapter 9. In re Jefferson Cnty. Ala., 469 
B.R. 92, 98 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012) (applying ALA. CODE 11-81-3 (LexisNexis 
2008)). 
 50. EUCALITTO ET AL., supra note 47, at 7. 
 51. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760 (West 2013).  Section 53760 provides: 
A local public entity in this state may file a petition and exercise powers 
pursuant to applicable federal bankruptcy law if either of the following 
apply: (a) The local public entity has participated in a neutral evaluation 
process pursuant to Section 53760.3[;] (b) The local public entity declares a 
fiscal emergency and adopts a resolution by a majority vote of the governing 
board pursuant to Section 53760.5. 
Id. 
 52. See generally DEBT ADJUSTMENTS FOR MUNICIPALITIES UNDER CHAPTER 9 
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE §7[1] (Francis J. Lawall et al. eds., 2012). 
 53. See generally id. 
 54. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012)  Section 904 provides: 
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the 
plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the 
case or otherwise, interfere with—(1) any of the political or governmental 
powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or 
(3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property. 
Id. 
 55. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (not incorporating § 1104 (appointment of a trustee) 
into Chapter 9); see also Spellings v. Dewey, 122 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1941) (bankruptcy 
court could not interfere in any manner with right of Arkansas drainage district 
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a bankruptcy court’s power is limited to approving the petition, 
confirming the plan, and ensuring that plan obligations are met.56  A 
municipality in bankruptcy may manage itself while taking advantage 
of the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions.57  In re Willacy County Water 
Control & Improvement District No. 1 makes clear that the 
bankruptcy court can only 
determine insolvency or inability to meet debts as they mature, and 
whether the plan proposed is in accordance with the provisions of 
the statute, and whether it has been accepted by the number of 
creditors provided, and whether the petitioner is in a position to 
carry out the terms of the plan, and whether it is equitable, for the 
best interests of the creditors, and nondiscriminatory.58 
The court can only confirm the plan or dismiss the case based on its 
answers to these questions.59  As such, much of the litigation 
surrounding Chapter 9 cases involves the municipal debtor’s 
eligibility to seek Chapter 9 protection.60  The practical and 
constitutional limitations of Chapter 9 and differences between 
Chapter 9 and other chapters of the Code lead to limited Chapter 9 
filings. 
B. Treatment of Pensions in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
A pension plan is a scheme created by employers or an agency to 
provide income for employees when they retire.61  There are generally 
two types of pension plans: defined contribution plans and defined 
benefit plans.62  In a defined contribution plan, the employer and 
 
under Arkansas statutes to choose or remove its commissioners); In re N.Y.C. Off-
Track Betting Corp., 434 B.R. 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (where New York law 
was, at best, ambiguous regarding when off-track betting commissions must be paid 
postpetition, preferable course was for the Chapter 9 bankruptcy court to abstain 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c), as political or governmental powers of debtor could not be 
limited by court under § 904). 
 56. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 57. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 58. In re Willacy Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 36 F. Supp. 36, 
39 (S.D. Tex. 1940). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., National Public Finance Guaranty Corporation’s Objection to the 
City of Stockton’s Qualifications Under Sections 109(c) and 921(c) at 1–10, In re 
Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 477 (seeking 
dismissal of Stockton’s Chapter 9 case because of Stockton’s alleged failure to meet 
the requirements stated in 109(c)). 
 61. See Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
 62. Id. 
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employee may make contributions to the plan fund, “the employer’s 
contribution is fixed[,] and the employee receives whatever level of 
benefits the amount contributed on his behalf will provide.”63  “A 
defined contribution plan ‘provides for an individual account for each 
participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed 
to the participant’s account.’”64  Since each individual in a defined 
contribution pension plan is only entitled to payouts from the assets 
dedicated to the individual account, there cannot be a deficiency of 
funds in the plan to cover promised benefits.65  The United States 
Code specifies that any pension plan that is not a defined contribution 
plan is a defined benefit plan.66  A defined benefit plan “consists of a 
general pool of assets rather than individual dedicated accounts.  
Such a plan, ‘as its name implies, is one where the employee, upon 
retirement, is entitled to a fixed periodic payment.’”67  In a defined 
benefit plan, the asset pool may be funded by the employer, the 
employee, or both.68  Although the employee may also make 
contributions to the asset pool, the employer typically bears all of the 
investment risk and usually bears any loss resulting from any 
investment shortfall.69  On the other hand, if a defined benefit fund is 
overfunded, the employer is permitted to reduce or suspend 
contributions.70 
Only defined benefit pension systems are affected in bankruptcy 
because defined contribution pension systems are presumed to be 
fully funded.  Each individual in a defined contribution pension plan 
is only entitled to payouts from the assets dedicated to the individual 
account.71  Defined benefit pension systems can either be funded or 
 
 63. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999) (quoting Nachman 
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 364 n.5 (1980)). 
 64. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006)). 
 65. Nachman Corp., 444 U.S. at 364 n.5. 
 66. 26 U.S.C. § 414(j) (2006). 
 67. Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. at 439 (quoting Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. 
Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 154 (1993)). 
 68. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c) (2006)). 
 69. See id. (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 232 
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring); JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
LAW § 8:4 (1998)). 
 70. See Nachman, 444 U.S. at 363–64 n.5 (noting that “the employer’s 
contribution is adjusted to whatever level is necessary” to provide the defined 
benefits (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 71. Id. 
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unfunded.72  A funded plan means the employer is contributing assets 
that are invested.73  However, even some funded defined benefit 
pension systems are underfunded as a result of overly ambitious 
assumptions on investment returns and failure to fund pension plans 
when the employer is strapped for cash.74  An unfunded pension plan 
means that no assets are set aside and benefits are paid for by the 
employer to the retiree as and when they are paid.75  This plan is 
commonly referred to as a “pay-as-you-go” system.76  Funded and 
unfunded plans are both affected in bankruptcy because funded plans 
can be underfunded and unfunded plans are a problem when the 
employer simply does not have the money to meet obligations.77  
However, Chapter 11 only deals with underfunded plans78 because the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prohibits 
unfunded, or pay-as-you-go plans.79  Both unfunded and underfunded 
plans are at issue in Chapter 9. 
Chapter 11 also distinguishes between vested and unvested pension 
plans.  This distinction typically is governed by federal law, dictating 
when the pension plan vests, if at all.  This distinction is, however, 
informed by state law.  To be vested means that the employee has a 
right to the pension plan that cannot be decreased.80  If plans are 
unvested, the employee does not yet have a right to the benefits.81  
The pension plan may be modified by the employer in bankruptcy 
until the plan vests under federal law.82  Outside of bankruptcy, the 
question of when the pension plan vests and whether and to what 
extent it can be modified is determined by state law. 
 
 72. See What You Should Know About Your Retirement Plan: Chapter 2, U.S. 
DEP’T LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/wyskapr.html#chapter2 (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See COURTNEY COLLINS & ANDREW J. RETTENMAIER, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
POLICY ANALYSIS, UNFUNDED LIABILITIES OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT BENEFIT PLANS 13 (2010), available at http://www.ncpa.org/ 
pdfs/st329.pdf. 
 75. See generally id. 
 76. Id. at 11. 
 77. See generally id. 
 78. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012). 
 79. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006).  ERISA sets minimum standards 
for funding and unfunded plans would not meet ERISA standards. See generally id. 
 80. See In re UAL Corp. (Pilots’ Pension Plan Termination), 468 F.3d 444, 447 
(7th Cir. 2006); In re Alan Wood Steel Co., No. 77-930 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20428, 
at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1978). 
 81. See 70 C.J.S. Pensions § 119 (2005). 
 82. See In re Bastian Co., 45 B.R. 717, 720 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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Private sector defined benefit pension plans can be modified or 
terminated in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, but not solely as a matter of 
federal bankruptcy law.83  ERISA, the statute governing private 
sector defined-benefit pension plans, specifically provides for 
termination of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)-
insured plans both in and out of bankruptcy.84  The prerequisites for 
termination of PBGC-insured plans are listed in 29 U.S.C. § 
1341(c)(2)(B).85  In In re Wire Rope Corp. of America, the court 
determined that the debtor “cannot pay all of its debts under a plan 
of reorganization and continue in business, and that court approval of 
the termination of the Debtor’s Retirement Plan is appropriate.”86  
The bankruptcy court has the discretion in determining whether such 
entity will be unable to pay all debts pursuant to the plan of 
reorganization unless the plan is terminated.87  PBGC-insured private 
sector defined-benefit pension plans have been terminated or 
modified in bankruptcy pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1341: In re Kaiser 
Aluminum Corporation, where, the court held that an employer in a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy may terminate multiple pension plans 
voluntarily under the reorganization test88 and In re US Airways 
Group, where the court held that the financial requirements for a 
distress termination were met and approved the termination.89 
 
 83. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); In re Falcon Prods., 497 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 
2007). 
 84. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341; In re Bastian, 45 B.R. at 720. 
 85. The statute provides: 
The requirements of this clause are met by a person if— 
(I) such person has filed, or has had filed against such person, as of the 
proposed termination date, a petition seeking reorganization in a case under 
Title 11 or under any similar law of a State or political subdivision of a State 
(or a case described in clause (i) filed by or against such person has been 
converted, as of such date, to such a case in which reorganization is sought), 
(II) such case has not, as of the proposed termination date, been dismissed, 
(III) such person timely submits to the corporation any request for the 
approval of the bankruptcy court (or other appropriate court in a case 
under such similar law of a State or political subdivision) of the plan 
termination, and (IV) the bankruptcy court (or such other appropriate 
court) determines that, unless the plan is terminated, such person will be 
unable to pay all its debts pursuant to a plan of reorganization and will be 
unable to continue in business outside the chapter 11 reorganization process 
and approves the termination. 
29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 86. 287 B.R. 771, 781 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002). 
 87. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV). 
 88. See 456 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 89. 296 B.R. 734 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). 
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C. Added Complications of Chapter 9 
Private sector pension plans can be modified or terminated by 
debtors in Chapter 11 bankruptcies.90  However, Chapter 9 
bankruptcies are more complicated vis-à-vis pension plans.  Private 
sector defined benefit plans are typically insured by the PBGC 
through ERISA, while public sector defined benefit pension plans are 
not.91  ERISA only governs private sector pension plans.92  
Consequently, there is no federal insurer of public sector pension 
plans as in the private sector. 
While §§ 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code govern such plans 
in the context of a bankruptcy case pending under Chapter 11 of the 
Code, where private sector defined-benefit plans are at issue, they do 
not apply in a Chapter 9 bankruptcy involving a municipal debtor.93  
Section 1113 provides for extensive requirements that must be met 
when rejecting a collective bargaining agreement under § 365.94  
Section 1114 provides more stringent requirements when the debtor 
is considering modification of insurance benefits to retirees.95  
Congress enacted both of these provisions in reaction to the ruling in 
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, where the Supreme Court allowed 
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement without engaging in 
further collective bargaining.96  Despite the absence of §§ 1113 and 
1114 from § 901, Bildisco may govern in Chapter 9.  Bildisco is a 
decision regarding § 365, which does apply in a Chapter 9 case.97  The 
 
 90. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341; In re Bastian Co., 45 B.R. 717, 720 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 
1985). 
 91. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006) (noting that one of the purposes of the PBGC is 
to encourage private pension plans). 
 92. See id. 
 93. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (omitting §§ 1113 and 1114 from the list of sections of 
the Bankruptcy Code that apply in Chapter 9). 
 94. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (2012).  The statute provides: 
The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective 
bargaining agreement only if the court finds that—(1) the trustee has, prior 
to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the requirements of subsection 
(b)(1); (2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to 
accept such proposal without good cause; and (3) the balance of the equities 
clearly favors rejection of such agreement. 
Id. 
 95. 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012). 
 96. 465 U.S. 513 (1984). 
 97. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (listing § 365 as a provision that applies in Chapter 9). 
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court in In re City of Vallejo stated that Bildisco applies when 
interpreting § 365, but not all courts would necessarily agree.98 
The principles of federalism also complicate public sector pension 
plans in Chapter 9 bankruptcies.99  Chapter 9 governs municipality 
bankruptcies though federal law while municipality governance is a 
product of state law.  Although ERISA governs private sector 
pension plans, there is no federal law equivalent governing public 
sector pension plans, because public sector pension plans are a 
product of state and local law.  These factors make modification of 
public sector pension plans in a Chapter 9 bankruptcy and the legal 
rationale behind contested modifications a new area of law. 
D. California as the Focus 
This Note focuses on public sector pension plans in California for a 
number of reasons.  California has a broad statute enabling its 
municipalities to file for Chapter 9 protection.100  This means that 
California gives broad access for its municipalities to take advantage 
of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code allowing municipalities to 
reorganize.  It does not condition its grant of Chapter 9 authority on 
being a certain class or type of municipality or having a specific type 
of debt.101  California also has the highest number of Chapter 9 filings 
of cities or counties to date.102  This is noteworthy because 
municipality bankruptcies are rare.  Orange County and the City of 
Vallejo have recently exited bankruptcy.  Stockton, Mammoth Lakes, 
and San Bernadino all filed for Chapter 9 protection within two 
weeks of one another in July 2012.103  Past and present case law is 
helpful in analyzing municipality bankruptcies. 
California state law exacerbates problems facing California 
municipalities, which could result in more municipality bankruptcies 
 
 98. See In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 78–79 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009).  There is 
no case law where a court has rejected using Bildisco as governing law in Chapter 9 
where a collective bargaining agreement is at issue. 
 99. This issue is further addressed in Part II.A. 
 100. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760 (West 2012). 
 101. Compare with Pennsylvania and Alabama’s grants of authority. 
 102. Surprise! California Not No. 1 in Chapter 9 Filings, INVESTMENT NEWS (July 
16, 2012), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120716/FREE/120719948.  
Nebraska has the highest number of Chapter 9 filings, but only of special tax districts, 
not of cities or counties. Id. 
 103. Jim Christie, Update 3-San Bernardino 3rd California City to Seek 
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (July 11, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/ 
11/sanbernardino-bankruptcy-idUSL2E8IB2E520120711. 
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in the future unless the California legislature, or its population 
through referendum, changes the law to prevent municipalities from 
taking advantage of Chapter 9 or changing its state labor laws 
regarding pension plans to be more beneficial to employers in 
financial distress.  CalPERS is favored under state labor law.104  
Pension obligations in California are treated as contractual 
obligations.  This treatment of pension obligations allows for an 
analysis of whether these contractual obligations are executory 
contracts subject to rejection in bankruptcy and gives rise to a 
discussion of what happens after executory contracts are rejected.  
The California Constitution prohibits municipalities from imposing 
property taxes exceeding one percent of the property value.105  This 
restriction prevents municipalities from raising revenue through 
raises in property taxes.106 
II.  FEDERAL LAW V. STATE LAW AND THE NATURE OF PENSION 
PLANS 
A. Federalism Issues in Chapter 9: Where State and Federal 
Powers Conflict 
Bankruptcy is an area where federal law and state law intersect and 
as a result, conflict.  The federal government derives its power to 
enact bankruptcy laws from the Constitution.107  The Constitution 
explicitly states, “The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish . . . 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”108  Therefore, the federal grant of power is exclusive and 
comes directly from the language of the Constitution.109  If Congress 
enacts laws of bankruptcy, any contradictory state law is deemed 
preempted in the bankruptcy context.110 
 
 104. For more information on California state labor law, see infra Part II.E.1. 
 105. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §1(a). (“The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax 
on real property shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such 
property.  The one percent (1%) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned 
according to law to the districts within the counties.”). 
 106. See id. 
 107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id; see also In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009). 
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The federal government also has the exclusive power to abrogate 
contracts.111  Bankruptcy is an important tool for financially distressed 
entities because it allows debtors, either as debtors-in-possession or 
through a trustee to abrogate contracts that are deemed to not have 
any net benefit on the estate.112  States cannot abrogate contracts, so 
debtors must take advantage of the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code in order to do so.113 
The power of state governments also originates from the 
Constitution.  The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”114  In the context of bankruptcy, the power to enact laws of 
bankruptcy has been specifically delegated to the federal 
government.115  Although Congress has exclusive power to enact 
bankruptcy laws, Congress has left some room for states to legislate in 
the context of municipality bankruptcies.  Section 903 states, 
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, 
by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the 
exercise of the political or governmental powers of such 
municipality, including expenditures for such exercise, but—(1) a 
State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of 
such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to 
such composition; and (2) a judgment entered under such a law may 
not bind a creditor that does not consent to such composition.116 
This provision leaves room to legislate and respects the sovereignty 
of states to regulate their municipalities.117  State laws do have some 
effect in bankruptcy.  Section 903 appears to limit the ability of 
municipalities in Chapter 9 to take full advantage of provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code by reserving deference to state law. 
 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, 
or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of 
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass 
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.”). 
 112. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (allowing debtors to reject executory 
contracts); 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012) (allowing debtors to assign contracts even if the 
contract prohibits assignment). 
 113. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (stating that no state may abrogate contracts). 
 114. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 116. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
 117. See id. 
LAU_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:17 PM 
1992 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
States are also given the authority to dictate whether their 
municipalities may take advantage of Chapter 9 through the second 
requirement of § 109—the requirement that states explicitly authorize 
municipality bankruptcy by statute.118  The court in In re City of 
Vallejo makes clear that states may only prevent municipalities from 
entering bankruptcy as a threshold issue.119  Once municipalities are in 
Chapter 9, all provisions listed in § 901 and Chapter 9 apply.120  
Because each provision of the Bankruptcy Code governs a small 
aspect of the reorganization, the Bankruptcy Code must be read as a 
whole.  Although states are constitutionally prohibited from 
abrogating contracts, the federal government may do so and the 
Bankruptcy Clause allows the federal government to abrogate 
contracts.121  Therefore, federal law must trump state law in 
bankruptcy for municipalities to modify pension obligations, if 
pension obligations are deemed to be contractual rights. 
B. Various State Law Perspectives on the Nature of Pension 
Plans and Their Ability to be Modified in Bankruptcy 
Public pension plans are generally created under state or local 
law.122  Outside of bankruptcy, modification of pension plans depends 
on state law.123  In bankruptcy, modification of pension plans largely 
depends on whether the pension plan is an executory contract that 
can be rejected.  There are three main state law perspectives on the 
nature of pension plans.  Pension plans can be viewed as a gratuity, a 
property right, or a contractual right.124  This view has evolved over 
the years and a majority of jurisdictions, including California, now 
view pension plans as contractual rights. 
Pension plans may be modified or terminated in those jurisdictions 
that view pension plans as gratuities, as long as payouts to pension 
plan beneficiaries have not already been made.125  These jurisdictions 
 
 118. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
 119. In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See U.S. CONST. art I. §10, cl. 1, 4. 
 122. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2006). 
 123. Pension Plan Modifications Provide Sustainability, NAT’L INST. ON 
RETIREMENT SECURITY, (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.nirsonline.org/index.php?option= 
content&task=view&id=733 (stating that forty-five states have enacted defined 
benefit pension reforms since 2008). 
 124. Discussed infra. 
 125. See Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 1944) (regarding the 
pension plan of a railroad company outside of bankruptcy). 
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view pension plans as gifts from the employer, public or private, that 
the employees do not have any legal right to, until the benefits are 
actually paid out.126  Since employees generally do not make 
contributions to the pension plan, the employer may grant or 
withhold benefits, terminate or withdraw the making of contributions, 
or completely terminate the pension plan at will.127  This view of 
pension plans as gratuities has changed in most jurisdictions.  
Jurisdictions that viewed pension plans as gratuities in the past have 
altered their views regarding pension plans and now view them as 
either property rights or contractual rights.  This change is due to the 
fact that there is now an expectation of pension benefits upon 
retirement.128  Most public and private sector employees enter into 
employment with the expectation that there will be some contribution 
to retirement benefits by the employer that they will receive upon 
retirement.  The view that pension plans are gratuities that can be 
modified or terminated at the will of the employer has been 
considered too draconian, and has largely disappeared. 
A significant minority of jurisdictions view pension plans as 
property rights subject to constitutional due process protection.  In 
these jurisdictions, broad modifications of pension benefits may be 
possible, provided that due process is afforded, especially where the 
modifications are necessary to preserve the financial viability of the 
pension plan and to protect the participants’ property rights.129  In re 
Marriage of Roehn held that a non-employee spouse’s future benefits 
from pension fund are a form of deferred compensation and therefore 
 
 126. See id. 
 127. Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l Union, 193 F. Supp. 699, 
700 (D.D.C 1961), aff’d sub nom., Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l 
Union of Am., 307 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
 128. But see id. (stating that there is no expectation to pension benefits). 
 129. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Ellman & Merrett, supra note 20, at 
382–83 (2011) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall ... be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”)); see also Spina v. Consol. Police & 
Firemen’s Pension Fund Comm’n, 197 A.2d 169, 175 (N.J. 1964) (“[W]e think the 
employee has a property interest in an existing fund which the State could not simply 
confiscate.”); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 304 (N.M. 1995) (“Property rights are also 
protected under the [D]ue [P]rocess and [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lauses.”); State ex 
rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 648–53 (Ohio 1998) 
(evaluating legislation modifying the treatment of mandatory contributions to 
retirement system under Takings Clause and Equal Protection Clause). 
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property.130  In re Gendreau held that pension plans are property 
rights that cannot be discharged.131  In jurisdictions that view pension 
plans as property rights, pension plans cannot be modified without 
due process of law whether they are vested (In re Marriage of 
Roehn)132 or unvested (In re Gendreau).133  Since these jurisdictions 
do not view public pensions as contracts, outright rejection under § 
365 is not an available tool.  Any modification of public pension plans 
must be made with due process. 
In a majority of jurisdictions, including California, employees are 
recognized to possess an express or implied contractual right to their 
pension benefits once they begin employment with a municipality.  
This view has been established through common law, state 
constitutions, and state statutes.  In Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, the 
Washington Supreme Court held that a public “employee who 
accepts a job to which a pension plan is applicable contracts for a 
substantial pension and is entitled to receive the same when he has 
fulfilled the prescribed conditions.”134  In Calabro v. City of Omaha, 
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that “a public employee’s 
constitutionally protected right in his or her pension vests upon the 
acceptance and commencement of employment, subject to reasonable 
or equitable unilateral changes by the Legislature.”135  Betts v. Board 
of Administration of Public Employees’ Retirement System held that 
“a public employee’s pension constitutes an element of 
compensation, and a vested contractual right to pension benefits 
accrues upon acceptance of employment.  Such a pension right may 
not be destroyed, once vested, without impairing a contractual 
obligation of the employing public entity.”136  The Illinois 
Constitution establishes that pension benefits are contractual rights.137  
California has enacted state statutes stating pension benefits are 
 
 130. In re Marriage of Roehn, 576 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
 131. In re Gendreau, 191 B.R. 798, 805 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), aff’d, 122 F.3d 815 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
 132. 576 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ill. 1991). 
 133. 191 B.R. 798, 805 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) aff’d, 122 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 134. Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 296 P.2d 536, 540 (Wash. 1956). 
 135. Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Neb. 1995). 
 136. Betts v. Bd. of Admin. of Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 21 Cal. 3d 859, 863 (Cal. 
1978). 
 137. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5. 
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contractual rights that cannot be abrogated.138  In jurisdictions where 
pension plans are contractual rights, such as California, they may be 
treated as executory contracts that may be rejected in bankruptcy. 
Jurisdictions that consider pension plans to be contractual rights 
generally distinguish between vested and unvested rights, discussed 
infra.  The state law concept does not bind federal bankruptcy courts 
construing the Bankruptcy Code because of the Supremacy Clause;139 
nevertheless, § 365 has been construed to prevent rejection of vested 
rights (as the term is understood under federal bankruptcy law). 
C. Whether a Pension Plan is an Executory Contract: The 
Countryman Test 
In those jurisdictions where pension plans are viewed as 
contractual rights, the pension plans may be rejected if they are 
determined to be executory contracts.  Section 365, which permits the 
rejection of executory contracts,140 applies in Chapter 9 cases.141  
However, the term “executory contract” is not defined in the 
Bankruptcy Code.  While federal bankruptcy law defines the scope 
and effect of such a rejection, and while the definition of an executory 
contract is ultimately a federal question, these issues are informed by 
state law.142  Countryman’s test, which determines which contracts are 
executory and which are not, tries to determine precisely what this 
federal standard is and how it relates to state law concepts of what is 
executory. 
Professor Countryman defines an executory contract as a contract 
“under which the only obligation of both the bankrupt and the other 
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either 
to complete the performance would constitute a material breach 
 
 138. CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS., VESTED RIGHTS OF CALPERS MEMBERS, 
PROTECTING THE PENSION PROMISES MADE TO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, (2011), available 
at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/vested-rights.pdf. 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the 
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 140. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012). 
 141. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012). 
 142. Horton v. Rehbein (In re Rehbein), 60 B.R. 436, 440 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) 
(“Whether a contract is executory is a question of federal law.”) (citing In re Cochise 
College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1348 n.4 (9th Cir.1983); In re Alexander, 670 F.2d 
885, 888 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
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excusing the performance of the other.”143  The Ninth Circuit adopted 
Countryman’s test.144  The Supreme Court in Bildisco has 
substantially adopted the same definition.145  Under this definition, 
vested rights typically do not qualify as an executory contract, 
whereas unvested rights would qualify as an executory contract. 
Whether and when a pension plan vests and whether the pension 
plan is vested or unvested at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed is 
a matter of federal law that is informed by state law.  Whether the 
contract is executory can turn on whether the pension plan has 
vested.  The state law concept does not bind federal bankruptcy 
courts construing the Bankruptcy Code because of the Supremacy 
Clause; nevertheless, § 365 has been construed to prevent rejection of 
vested rights (as the term is understood under federal bankruptcy 
law). 
The bankruptcy court in In re Bastian Co., which involved a private 
employer in Chapter 11 with an ERISA-governed plan, held that 
pension plans are executory contracts subject to § 365 because 
performance remains on both sides.146  Employees need to work for 
continued pension contributions and the employer needs to continue 
contributing to the pension plan in order to compel employee 
performance.147  In re Philip Service Corporation, on the other hand, 
held that distress termination of an unvested private sector pension 
plan was not allowed under ERISA and the debtor may not reject an 
ERISA-governed pension plan as an executory contract.148  A 
bankruptcy court in Texas determined that a specific statute (ERISA) 
trumps a general, broad statute (Bankruptcy Code).149  The courts are 
therefore divided as to whether unvested pension plans can be 
rejected as executory contracts. 
The Seventh Circuit in In re UAL Corp. (Pilots’ Pension Plan 
Termination) held that the “‘[t]ermination’ of a plan does not end 
anyone’s right to receive vested benefits; it just prevents an increase 
 
 143. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 439, 460 (1973). 
 144. See In re Alexander, 670 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 145. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 & n.6 (1984). 
 146. In re Bastian Co., 45 B.R. 717, 721 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Similarly, there 
is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code excluding pension plans from § 365.  
Therefore, pension plans are rejectable as executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 
365.”). 
 147. Id. at 720–21. 
 148. 310 B.R. 802, 809 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004). 
 149. Id. 
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in those benefits, which will be paid from the trust and, to the extent 
that fund is insufficient, by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation.”150  The Pennsylvania bankruptcy court in In re Alan 
Wood Steel Co. found that a pension plan with vested participants 
was not a wholly executory contract and could not be rejected:151 
The debtor, by the completion of the plan-participants’ age and 
service requirements for vesting under the plans, has received all of 
the consideration for which it bargained with its employees.  The 
contracts between them are executed except for the debtor’s 
obligation to pay the specified benefits in the case of the Hourly 
Plan, and make certain accrued periodic contributions under the 
Salaried Plan.  By a “rejection” the debtor would be relinquishing 
no benefits; it would merely be repudiating its obligations.152 
The bankruptcy courts are generally in agreement that once a 
pension plan has vested, the contract is no longer wholly executory 
and cannot be rejected as such. 
Where pension obligations are tied to a collective bargaining 
agreement, the municipality may have to reject the entire agreement 
in order to reject the pension obligation, provided that the collective 
bargaining agreement is viewed as a single contract.  Occasionally, the 
collective bargaining agreement is viewed as separate contracts.  In 
this situation, one portion, as long as determined to be executory may 
be rejected pursuant to § 365.  Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code 
does not allow a debtor to “cherry pick” which portions of contracts 
to assume or reject, but rather the debtor must assume reject the 
contract in its entirety.153 
Courts have held that private sector pension plans are executory 
contracts rejectable in bankruptcy.154  A bankruptcy court in New 
York in In re McFarlin’s Inc., held that the collective bargaining 
agreement upon which a pension plan was based was an executory 
contract that could be rejected in bankruptcy and thus the claim 
 
 150. 468 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 151. No. 77-930, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20428, at *51 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 
1978). 
 152. Id. at *16. 
 153. Pieco, Inc. v. Atl. Computer Sys., 173 B.R. 844, 849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(citing Hurly v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 213 U.S. 126 (1909); In re 
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 321 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1963)). 
 154. See, e.g., In re Am. R. Co. of P.R., 110 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R.1952), aff’d, 202 
F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1953); see also In re Alan Wood Steel Co., No. 77-930, 1978 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20428 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1978), aff’d, 449 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Pa. 
1978). 
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would be treated as a general unsecured claim.155  The claim would 
not be treated as a first priority under § 507(a), which contemplates 
administrative claims, including costs of running a business in 
bankruptcy, having a priority over general unsecured claims.156  
Subtitle E of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1381, from the Multiemployer 
Pension Plan Amendments of 1980 deals with unfunded vested 
pension plan interests and withdrawal liability for the employer.157  
Congress excluded collective bargaining agreements from the 
Railway Labor Act but not the National Labor Relations Act, 
thereby demonstrating that Congress knew how to exclude collective 
bargaining agreements when it wanted to.158  Its failure to exclude 
collective bargaining agreements from § 365 may indicate that it 
meant to include collective bargaining agreements.159  In re Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp. also held that pension plans are executory 
contracts.160  In In re Robinson Truck Line, a Mississippi bankruptcy 
court held that a Chapter 11 debtor could assume the private sector 
pension plan as an executory contract upon the adequate assurance of 
a prompt cure of prepetition arrearages rather than upon immediate 
cash payment of the total arrearage on the effective date of the 
Chapter 11 plan, and that the prepetition arrearage could be classified 
with priority for unsecured claims for contributions to the employee 
benefit plan.161  This treatment is exactly what is required under § 365 
for rejection or assumption of an executory contract.162  This line of 
case law addressing private sector pension plans as executory 
contracts subject to rejection under § 365 in a bankruptcy case 
indicates that this option may also be available in a municipality 
bankruptcy dealing with public sector pension plans, provided that 
the pension plan has not already vested. 
California’s municipalities have a contractual relationship with 
CalPERS, the administrator of its public employee pension plans.163  
 
 155. In re McFarlin’s Inc., 46 B.R. 88, 90 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 156. Id. at 90. 
 157. Id. at 89. 
 158. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1984). 
 159. Id. 
 160. 103 B.R. 672 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). 
 161. 47 B.R. 631 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985). 
 162. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012). 
 163. CalPERS’ Brief in Support of the City of Stockton’s Petition at 5, In re City of 
Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 711.  The brief 
states: 
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This contract may also be analyzed to determine if it is executory.  
California municipalities are obligated to make contributions to 
CalPERS in return for CalPERS continuing to administer their public 
sector pension plans.164  CalPERS claims that the relationship 
between the municipality and CalPERS is contractual, established by 
statute and common law.165  If the relationship is a contract, it appears 
to be executory under Countryman’s test, because there are 
obligations left for both municipalities and CalPERS. 
D. Rejection as a Prepetition Breach of Contract 
Rejection has been compared to a prepetition breach of contract.  
As such, rejection results in a prepetition claim against the estate for 
breach of that contract.  A debtor’s ability to reject or assume 
contracts often results in negotiation in the shadow of this law. 
E. Federalism Issues Regarding Treatment of the Pension Plan 
as a Prepetition Breach of Contract Claim 
Once a public pension plan has been rejected as an executory 
contract and a claim has been filed against the estate as a prepetition 
breach of contract claim, state law and federal law may conflict 
regarding how the claim will be treated in bankruptcy.  Whether state 
law or federal law is binding determines how a pension plan may be 
treated in bankruptcy.  Here, California state labor law and federal 
law are analyzed because California state law and federal bankruptcy 
law are the most at odds. 
 
For public employees serving municipalities in California, CalPERS 
provides retirement benefits to employees through a three-way structure: 
(1) the municipality has a “contract” with CalPERS that triggers statutes 
and other laws governing the provision of pension benefits through 
CalPERS; (2) the public servant has an employment contract with the 
municipality that includes pension benefits; and (3) CalPERS has a fiduciary 
responsibility to provide and protect the pension benefits of its employee 
members. This three-way structure is the basis for the trust relationship 
between the parties where the municipality is the trustor, the members are 
the beneficiaries and CalPERS is the trustee. 
Id. 
 164. See id. at 2 (“The relationship between CalPERS and the City is executory in 
nature: CalPERS continues to provide benefits and the City continues to report, fund 
and otherwise comply with State law in connection with its participation in the 
system. The City’s obligations to CalPERS are not negotiable.”). 
 165. See id. at 5–6. 
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1. Treatment Under California State Labor Law 
Under California state law, there is generally a vested/unvested 
distinction, where unvested pension plans may be modified or 
terminated, whereas vested rights cannot be impaired.166  This is true 
even if the pension plan has been rejected as an executory contract.  
Whether the claim against the bankruptcy estate can be impaired 
through a plan of reorganization also depends on this distinction. 
A state’s distinction between vested and unvested rights may differ 
from that of federal law.  In California, pension plans vest on the first 
day of employment167 because state statutes create contractual rights 
on the first day of employment.168  These rights are private contractual 
rights, as explained by the court in California Teachers Association: 
“[the] statute offering pension rights in return for employee services 
expresses an element of exchange and thereby implies these rights 
will be private rights in the nature of contract.”169 
Early California labor law allowed for flexibility in modifying 
pension plans.  Kern provided for “reasonable modifications” stating 
that “pension systems must be kept flexible to permit adjustments in 
accord with changing conditions and at the same time maintain the 
integrity of the system and carry out its beneficent policy.”170  After 
Kern, California courts adopted a new rule regarding pension plans, 
ruling that changes are to be consistent with the theory of a pension 
system and that all detrimental changes be offset by “comparable new 
advantages.”171  Twelve other states have adopted California’s rule in 
Allen requiring “comparable new advantages” when modifying a 
pension plan.172  This new rule limits employers within the state’s 
 
 166. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, Statutes As Contracts? The “California Rule” 
and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1050–51 (2012) 
(describing California’s distinction between vested and unvested pension plans). 
 167. Betts v. Bd. of Admin. of the Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 582 P.2d 614, 617 
(Cal. 1978) (en banc) (stating that the right to a “substantial” or “reasonable” 
pension accrues on first day of employment). 
 168. Monahan, supra note 166, at 1046. 
 169. Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Cory, 202 Cal. Rptr. 611, 618 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 170. Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947) (en banc). 
 171. Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (citing Wallace v. City of 
Fresno, 265 P.2d 884, 887–88 (Cal. 1954); Packer v. Bd. of Ret. of L.A. Cnty. Peace 
Officers’ Ret. Sys., 217 P.2d 660, 661–62, 664–65 (Cal. 1950) (en banc)). 
 172. Monahan, supra note 166, at 1071.  These states are Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, and Washington. Id.  Compare this list with the list of states that allow 
broad access to Chapter 9.  Those states that allow broad access to Chapter 9 and 
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ability to make changes to pension benefits of all current employees.  
For example, a statutory change adding a new dollar-amount 
maximum for pension benefits was impermissible because the change 
came with no comparable advantage to participants.173  As a result, 
pension benefits cannot be detrimentally changed, even if the change 
is only prospective.  These new advantages must also be 
contemporaneous with detrimental changes.174  California courts later 
expanded their rule even further to limit modifications to future 
accruals.  In Legislature v. Eu, the California Supreme Court went 
even further than the court in United Firefighters, explicitly 
recognizing the “collateral right to earn future pension benefits 
through continued service, on terms substantially equivalent to those 
then offered.”175  This means that even the rate of future accruals 
cannot be altered.176  California courts have never explained why 
future accruals must be protected, especially since public employees 
can be fired and their compensation lowered.177 
In states like California, where state labor laws and public policy 
concerns favor employees, states may argue that their laws apply in 
treatment of claims in bankruptcy.  The states may cite to other areas 
of bankruptcy where the Bankruptcy Code allows deference to state 
law.  These provisions include § 522, under which debtors may opt to 
take state law exemptions instead of the federal exemptions of 
personal assets from the bankruptcy estate.178  Bankruptcy courts 
 
have adopted California’s rule in Allen will face similar problems to California when 
trying to negotiate changes to pension plans in bankruptcy. 
 173. Chapin v. City Comn’n, 307 P.2d 657, 660 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). 
 174. See Betts v. Bd. of Admin. of the Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 582 P.2d 614, 619 
(Cal. 1978) (improvement enacted in 1963 could not be used to justify detrimental 
change in 1974); Abbott v. City of San Diego, 332 P.2d 324, 329 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1958). 
 175. Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1331 (Cal. 1991). 
 176. Id.; Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765 (Cal. 1955). 
 177. Monahan, supra note 166, at 1077. 
 178. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012).  Section 522 provides in pertinent part: 
(3) Property listed in this paragraph is—(A) subject to subsections (o) and 
(p), any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection 
(d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the 
filing of the petition to the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been 
located for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the 
petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a single State for 
such 730-day period, the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located 
for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer 
portion of such 180-day period than in any other place. 
Id. (b)(3)(A). 
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have also given great deference to states in how to treat severance 
pay to employees, whether as an administrative expense in 
bankruptcy, which is given the second priority under § 507, or as a 
prepetition claim.179 
States that want their state labor laws to apply may argue that § 
943(b)(4) prevents the bankruptcy court from confirming a plan of 
reorganization that impairs pension plans in violation of state law.180  
If impairing vested pension plans is a violation of state law, as it is in 
California under its definition of what it means to be a vested plan, 
then the bankruptcy court cannot confirm a plan that impairs pension 
plans.  However, what § 943(b)(4) means as applied to Chapter 9 
bankruptcies can be compared with § 1129 requirements for plan 
confirmation in Chapter 11 bankruptcies.  Section 1129 also contains 
a provision where a plan cannot be confirmed if the plan includes 
modifications that violate state law or nonbankruptcy federal law 
outside of bankruptcy.181 
CalPERS, in its brief in the Stockton bankruptcy case in support of 
Stockton’s eligibility, argues that state law protects public employee 
pension funds and prevents California and its municipalities from 
“raiding pension funds to balance the State budget.”182  CalPERS 
argues that under California state law, including the California 
Constitution, municipalities are unable to modify public pension 
plans subject to CalPERS administration.183  This relationship is 
 
 179. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2012). 
 180. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4) (2012) (“The court shall confirm the plan if . . . (4) the 
debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the 
plan.”). 
 181. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(16) (2012) (“All transfers of property under the plan shall 
be made in accordance with any applicable provisions of nonbankruptcy law that 
govern the transfer of property by a corporation or trust that is not a moneyed, 
business, or commercial corporation or trust.”). 
 182. Brief for Petitioner at 6, In re City of Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 711.  The brief states: 
Proposition 162 amended the California Constitution to provide that the 
CalPERS Board has “the sole and exclusive power to provide for actuarial 
services in order to assure the competency of the assets” of the system. CAL. 
CONST., art. XVI, sec. 17, subd. (e). The intent behind the measure was to 
protect public pension funds by vesting the authority to direct actuarial 
determinations solely with the governing board. See Lubic Dec., Exhibit 4 
at 36 (Relevant Portions of Official Ballot Pamphlet (Nov. 3, 1992)). By 
granting the CalPERS Board sole authority to administer the system, 
Proposition 162 prevented the legislative and executive branches from 
“raiding” pension funds to balance the State budget. 
Id. at 38. 
 183. See id. at 9. 
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defined by state law.184  CalPERS further argues that Stockton may 
terminate its relationship with CalPERS, but it would then be 
required to make a termination payment to CalPERS in an amount 
that would be sufficient to ensure that all accrued pension benefits 
can be paid.185  If Stockton terminates its relationship with CalPERS, 
its termination payment would be about $950 million, as determined 
by CalPERS.186  CalPERS therefore argues that under relevant state 
law, termination is not a viable option for Stockton.187 
2. Treatment Under Federal Bankruptcy Law 
Under federal law, the vested/unvested distinction merely confirms 
the existence of a contractual obligation.  While state law and state 
actors are constitutionally unable to abrogate contracts, federal law is 
not constrained by the Contract Clause in the US Constitution.188  The 
Bankruptcy Code is consistent with this view in allowing rejection of 
executory contracts and modification of contracts through a plan of 
reorganization. 
Once rejected, a claim for a prepetition breach of an executory 
contract (here, pension obligations) can be treated through a plan of 
reorganization.189  They must be part of executory contract (i.e. 
someone who has already retired is no longer party to an executory 
contract since the retiree presumably has fulfilled all material 
obligations of the contract and all that is left is for the municipality to 
fulfill its obligation to make pension plan contributions).  There is 
prior case law involving bankruptcies in both the private sector and 
the public sector regarding such modifications. 
There is precedent involving treatment of rejected Chapter 11 
pension plans in bankruptcy.  In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy involving 
an unvested private sector employer, the court treated the rejected 
executory contract, which included a pension plan, as a claim against 
 
 184. Id. at 9. 
 185. Id. at 13. 
 186. Id. at 14–15. 
 187. Id. at 15–18. 
 188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  The Contract Clause provides: 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any 
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill 
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 
Id. 
 189. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012). 
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the estate and a general unsecured claim in bankruptcy.190  The claim 
was not treated as a priority under § 507(a), which contemplates 
administrative claims, including costs of running a business in 
bankruptcy, having a priority over general unsecured claims.191 
There are also two examples of municipalities in Chapter 9 that 
have modified or terminated pension plans in bankruptcy.  First, 
Prichard, Alabama, filed for Chapter 9 protection in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Alabama on 
October 27, 2009.192  Pension obligations owed to former municipal 
employees was among the causes of Prichard’s filing.193  Pension debt 
was also among the causes of Prichard’s 1999 filing for Chapter 9 
protection.194  The plan of reorganization in Prichard’s first filing 
mandated a $16.5 million increase in the pension fund.195  However, 
this plan provision was never implemented, resulting in an increased 
retirement fund burden for the city.196  The pension fund finally ran 
out of money nine years after the 2010 plan was confirmed in 
September 2009.197  In response, the city simply stopped paying out 
pensions to its retirees.198  The retirees sued to enforce the 2010 plan 
 
 190. In re McFarlin’s Inc. 46 B.R. 88, 90 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Chapter 9 Voluntary Petition at 1, In re City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-15000 
(Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 1. 
 193. See Brief for Petitioner at 1, In re City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-15000 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 36.  The brief states: 
On August 13, 2009, the Prichard Retirees filed a complaint in the Circuit 
Court of Mobile County against the Debtor, the City of Prichard (“the 
Debtor” or “the City”), as well as Mayor Ron Davis and all five City 
Council Members for the City of Prichard. In Count One of their complaint, 
the Prichard Retirees allege that the defendants negligently failed to take 
steps to ensure the financial viability of the Prichard Pension Fund. In 
Count Two, the Prichard Retirees request that circuit court declare that the 
City violated this Court’s previous order dated October 6, 2000, which 
required the City to provide for the appropriate incremental $16.5 million 
payment to the Pension Fund, and enter judgment against the City for that 
amount. Finally, in Count Three, the Prichard Retirees allege that City 
Council Members Napolean Bracy, Herman Towner and Troy Ephriam, 
individually and in their capacities as members of the Board of Pension, 
breached their fiduciary duties to the Prichard Retirees, causing the 
Retirees to suffer damages. The Retirees demanded trial of their claims by 
jury. 
Id. at 1. 
 194. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 20, at 387. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Hueske, supra note 14. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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provisions, causing Prichard to seek Chapter 9 protection again.199  
Prichard proposed to restructure and cap the outstanding pension 
obligations owed to municipal retirees in its May 2010 plan.200  Their 
plan faced many objections from creditors resulting in amended 
versions of their plan for adjustment.201 
On August 11, 2010, Prichard’s creditors filed a motion to dismiss 
the Chapter 9 case, arguing that the city had never been authorized 
to seek Chapter 9 relief under the laws of Alabama, because it had 
no ‘refunding or funding’ bond debt as allegedly required under 
section 11-81-3 of the Alabama Code, and therefore did not satisfy 
the requirements for being a ‘debtor’ under Bankruptcy Code § 
109(c).202 
The bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss and Prichard 
appealed.203  The bankruptcy court stayed the case while the Alabama 
Supreme Court decided whether section 11-81-3 of the Alabama 
Code grants all municipalities authority to seek relief under Chapter 
9, or if such relief is limited to municipalities holding “refunding or 
funding debt.”204 
In Central Falls, Rhode Island, pension plan reductions were 
negotiated according to the City’s fourth amended plan of 
reorganization, confirmed on September 11, 2012.205  Classes 9 and 10 
were to be impaired classes of retirees.206  Class 9 retirees’ pensions 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Chapter 9 Plan of Adjustment at 8–9, In re City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-
15000 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 134. 
 201. Prichard filed five amended plans. Fifth Amended Plan of Adjustment, In re 
City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-15000 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 296. 
 202. Hueske, supra note 14; see also Motion to Dismiss Bankruptcy Case, In re 
City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-15000 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 186. 
 203. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Case, In re City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-
15000 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 202; Notice of Appeal to District 
Court, In re City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-15000 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), 
ECF No. 217. 
 204. Hueske, supra note 14. 
 205. Order Confirming Chapter 9 Plan at 2, In re City of Central Falls, R.I., No. 11-
13105 (D.R.I. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 572; Chapter 9 Plan Fourth Amended Plan for 
the Adjustment of Debts Filed by Debtor The City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, In 
re City of Central Falls, R.I., No. 11-13105 (Bankr. D.R.I. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 
479. 
 206. Chapter 9 Plan Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts Filed by 
Debtor The City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, In re City of Central Falls, R.I., No. 
11-13105 (Bankr. D.R.I. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 479.  Members of Class 9 and 10 are 
listed in Exhibits G and H of the plan, respectively. Id.  There are five members in 
Class 9, whose retirement benefits prior to the Chapter 9 filing are unclear, although 
it can be assumed that their benefits prior to the Chapter 9 filing were greater than 
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will be reduced to $10,000 and class 10 retirees’ pension would be 
reduced by fifty-five percent.207  The impaired classes under the 
Central Falls’ plan also included members who were already retired, 
where the benefits presumably already vested.208  Because both the 
Central Falls and Prichard cases involved reducing pension plans that 
were already vested (they were already retired and receiving checks), 
these cases indicate that both vested and unvested pension plans may 
be modified or terminated in bankruptcy. 
A cram down, where the bankruptcy court may impose a plan of 
reorganization over the objection of some impaired classes, is 
available under federal bankruptcy law and possibly applies to 
Chapter 9 bankruptcies.209  Section 1129 has been incorporated into 
Chapter 9 through § 901.210  Section 1129 deals with a cram down on 
creditors—impaired classes that do not agree with the plan of 
reorganization proposed.211  Under Chapter 11, meeting § 1129 
requirements if an impaired class does not vote in favor the plan of 
reorganization requires the bankruptcy court to find that the plan is 
fair and equitable to all creditors before confirming the plan.212  The 
fair and equitable requirement can be met in Chapter 11 as long as 
the absolute priority rule is met.213  However, the absolute priority 
rule cannot be met in Chapter 9 because municipalities cannot 
liquidate, and an analysis of what would occur if the municipality 
were to liquidate cannot be conducted.214  Therefore, the test in a 
Chapter 9 case for the fair and equitable requirement is whether what 
the impaired class is to receive under the plan of reorganization is all 
they can reasonably expect under the circumstances215  This requires 
the bankruptcy court to determine if the amount to be payable to an 
impaired class is fair given their level of priority in the bankruptcy 
case and whether it is fair given the situation.216  The court may 
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consider factors inherent in the running of a municipality.217  
Generally, however, courts give great deference to the municipality in 
determining what is fair.218 
III.  PENSION PLANS MAY BE REJECTED AS EXECUTORY 
CONTRACTS 
This discussion of rejecting pension plans as executory contracts 
must be limited to jurisdictions that view pension plans as executory 
contracts, because only those pension plans fall within § 365.  In 
jurisdictions such as California, where public employees’ rights under 
pension plans are viewed as contractual rights, pension plans may be 
rejected as executory contracts pursuant to § 365 as applied at a 
Chapter 9 municipal reorganization proceeding.219  The extent to 
which rejection amounts to a modification of pension plan obligations 
will depend upon the extent to which these obligations have “vested” 
under federal law.220  States may have varying definitions of what it 
means to be “vested” and California does have a very different 
definition of a vested pension plan within the state.221  Although 
federal law can be informed by state law definitions, due to 
federalism concerns and an interest in uniformity in administering 
bankruptcy estates, federal law ultimately trumps state law in the 
bankruptcy context.222  This makes sense, given the Supremacy 
Clause, Bankruptcy Clause, and Contracts Clause of the Constitution.  
Municipalities may, therefore, use the tools available in bankruptcy to 
reorganize debt and better provide for their constituencies going 
forward. 
In those jurisdictions that view pension plans as contractual rights, 
pension plans may be rejected under § 365 if they are found to be 
executory contracts.223  Pension plans of current employees are 
executory because there are obligations left to be performed on both 
sides to the contract.224  The employee must continue to work for the 
employer and the employer must continue to pay the employee and 
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contribute to the pension plan.225  Since there are obligations left on 
both sides, a pension plan as part of an employment contract is an 
executory contract under the Countryman test that can be rejected 
under § 365.226  Section 365 does not, however, permit rejection of 
employment contracts of employees who have already retired.227  
Rejection under § 365 only applies to executory contracts—it does 
not permit “rejection” in the absence of mutual performance 
obligations; it also does not permit “rejection” of vested rights, which 
must otherwise be respected in bankruptcy and in a plan of 
reorganization.228  These are not executory contracts because the only 
meaningful obligation left is for the employer to contribute to the 
pension plans.229  These rights have already been vested under federal 
law and cannot be abrogated.230  The municipality may, however, 
negotiate a modification with the retirees, as was the case in Prichard, 
Alabama and Central Falls, Rhode Island.231 
Once rejected, these pension plans can be treated under a plan of 
reorganization allowing for modification of pension plan 
obligations.232  A cram down is allowed under the Bankruptcy Code 
because § 1129 has been incorporated into Chapter 9.233  If public 
pensioners as an impaired class do not vote in favor of the plan of 
reorganization, the court can still confirm the plan if it is fair and 
equitable as to all creditors.234  The debtor may negotiate with 
employees with both vested and unvested rights.235  Nevertheless, a 
cram down is only applicable if the rights have not vested under 
federal law.236  In states like California, where the state views pension 
plans as “vested” on the first day of employment, the right may not be 
“vested” under federal law.237  Federal law definitions are binding.238  
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As such, the pension plans of those who have not yet retired or 
qualify to retire may be modified in bankruptcy.239 
In California, where pension plans have been determined to be 
contractual rights, pension plans that are unvested under federal law 
are executory contracts despite any state law to the contrary.240  
Furthermore, the relationship between CalPERS and state agencies 
and municipalities is executory, as conceded by CalPERS.241  This 
relationship can, therefore, also be rejected as an executory contract 
subject to a prepetition breach of contract claim.242  As such, the 
“termination payment” determined by CalPERS, may be negotiated 
as part of a bankruptcy case.243 
Since public sector pension plans in jurisdictions that view pension 
plans as contractual rights may be modified in bankruptcy, Congress 
and state legislatures must balance allowing municipalities to 
reorganize and meet obligations in their confirmed plans with 
protecting future retirees.  Congress can help municipalities by 
enacting a section of the Bankruptcy Code specifically allowing for 
the rejection of public pension plans as executory contracts to 
dissolve some of the uncertainty and hesitation with modification of 
public sector pension plans.  State legislatures may also enact laws 
that are more favorable to municipalities in bankruptcy.  In the 
alternative, if public policy dictates protecting public pensioners, 
Congress may enact a statute similar to ERISA in insuring public 
sector pension plans.  State legislatures may also further limit access 
to Chapter 9 to municipalities that do not have pension debt.  State 
legislatures may also enact a statute insuring public sector pension 
plans within the state. 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 9 is a seldom-used tool for eligible municipalities to 
organize their debts.  Although Chapter 9 filings are rare, they are 
becoming more widely used by municipalities that have, in good faith, 
exhausted all other mechanisms of renegotiating and reorganizing 
their debts.  In many municipalities facing bankruptcy, public 
employee pensions are a growing concern, with underfunded pension 
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plans.244  Because there is little case law on the treatment of pensions 
in Chapter 9, treatment of pensions in Chapter 11 may be analogous 
to how pension plans may be treated under Chapter 9.245  As such, 
treatment of pensions in Chapter 11 must be examined.246  However, 
Chapter 9 adds complications because of issues of federalism and 
limits on the power of the bankruptcy court. 247 
In jurisdictions such as California, where public employees’ rights 
under pension plans are viewed as contractual rights, pension plans 
may be rejected as executory contracts, pursuant to § 365, as applied 
at a Chapter 9 municipal reorganization proceeding.248  The extent to 
which rejection amounts to a modification of pension plan obligations 
will depend upon the extent to which these obligations have “vested” 
under federal law.249  Although there are competing definitions of 
what it means to be “vested,” the federal law definition ultimately 
binds municipalities availing themselves of the protection of Chapter 
9, a federal bankruptcy law concept.250  Once pension plans are 
rejected as executory contracts, claims for breach of that executory 
contract are treated as prepetition claims under § 365.251  As such, 
these claims may be dealt with in a plan of reorganization.252  In this 
plan, certain classes of creditors, including public employees with 
these claims for prepetition breach of contract, may be impaired.253  
As an impaired class, these public employees are granted voting 
rights in deciding whether to approve the proposed plan of 
reorganization filed by the municipality.254  Although it is preferred 
that the impaired class vote in favor of the plan, a cram down is 
available, where the court may impose the plan on creditors who do 
not vote in favor of the plan.255  Because the cram down is involuntary 
on the part of impaired creditors, the court must first make a finding 
that the plan is fair and equitable.256  Once this finding is made, the 
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court may approve the plan and the municipality may exit Chapter 
9.257  The municipality must then fulfill its obligations under the 
plan.258  Thus, municipalities may use the tools available in 
bankruptcy to reorganize debt and better provide for their 
constituencies going forward. 
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